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In Law and Revolution,1 Harold Berman provides an account
of the role of law in the historical development of western Europe
during the middle ages. The title hints at Berman's central thesis:
that the papal revolution in Europe in the eleventh and twelfth
centuries set a pattern that recurred in later revolutionary epochs.
The papal revolution worked a large change in social and legal con-
ditions in Europe and created the canon law as the first European
legal system. The revolutionary party, led by Pope Gregory VII,
succeeded in displacing an old society that had different legal tra-
ditions with a new society. The new society was unified by the
canon law, by the establishment of the rule of law as a firm princi-
ple, and by the organization of the Roman Catholic Church as a
bureaucratic centralized government for all of Europe. Centuries
before such developments in the national states, the Church was
already organized as a kind of state that could serve as a model for
secular government.
Professor Berman sees this revolution, which occurred around
the year 1100, as the first in a series of six western revolutions
-the later ones being the Reformation and the English, American,
French, and Russian revolutions. Although Berman does not dis-
cuss the similarities of these seemingly very different movements
in detail, he advances the view that messianic ideas of justice were
driving forces in all. The book has both a theoretical and an histor-
ical perspective. On the purely historical level it gives a compara-
tive summary of European legal history during the eleventh and
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twelfth centuries, often in some detail. On the theoretical level it
posits a social theory of justice in evaluating the historical develop-
ment of western Europe between 1100 and 1500.2
As an historical study of medieval legal history from 1100 to
1500, Berman's work is wide ranging, attempting to summarize the
developments in canon, roman, feudal, manorial, mercantile, ur-
ban, and royal law in nearly all countries of western Europe during
that period. Because Berman is not a specialist in any of these
fields, he has relied mainly on secondary sources. Selection in the
use of such literature is unavoidable, but Berman's survey has
many shortcomings beyond those usually found in this type of
work. Berman emphasizes work done in English, and to a much
lesser extent German or French, as a basis for his conclusions. No
account is taken of modern Italian or Spanish scholarship. Virtu-
ally all of the modern work Berman draws upon is written in En-
glish. He takes almost no account of modern German legal history,
although important contemporary German scholarship has greatly
altered our view of the very questions Berman treats.3 Thus, there
are serious distortions in the picture of European legal history
Berman develops.'
A few examples of objectionable superficiality in Berman's
book may be useful. Berman has a lengthy chapter on Germanic
folk-law, which he sees as the main legal context in which the pa-
pal revolution occurred. 5 In his description of tribal law of the ear-
lier middle ages, we find him restating the ideas about Germanic
traditions of law developed by Gierke6 in the nineteenth century
and often repeated and enlarged in more recent times, especially
by Fritz Kern.7 Berman sees Germanic tribal law as a static order
with nearly no change.8 The Germanic tribes supposedly had a
strong sense of community and trust, and retained their ancient
institutions up to the eleventh century. Berman does not realize
that nearly all of these notions have been undermined by impor-
2 Id. at 40.
s See, e.g., K. KROESCHELL, HAUS UND HERRSCHAFT IM FRUHEN DEUTSCHEN RECHT (1968);
G. KOBLER, DAs RECHT IM FRUHEN MITELALTER; UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZU HERKUNFT UND IN-
HALT FRUHMITTELALTERLICHER RECHTSBEGRIFFE IM DEUTSCHEN SPRACHGEBIET (1971).
4 Recent German work on the relations between law and liturgy, a theme stressed by
Berman, is also generally overlooked. See, e.g., H. DomBoIS, DAS RECHT DER GNADE (3 vols.,
1961-1983).
5 BERMAN at 49-84.
6 See 0. VON GiERKE, DAS DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAnSRECHT (1868-1913 & reprint
1954).
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tant and well-regarded modern scholarship. We know much less
about Germanic law than was thought 50 years ago. We do not
know whether Germanic tribes developed specific ideas of faith or
trust, nor do we know whether their social organization was domi-
nated by strong traditional elements from pagan times or was
mainly the product of foreign influence. It appears that vulgar Ro-
man law had a decisive influence on the emerging Germanic king-
doms, as did the model of biblical law in the earlier middle ages.
Even in antiquity Germanic society incorporated strong Christian
and Roman elements, and had only a few remnants of old Ger-
manic traditions. Berman's survey of early medieval law simply
omits to take account of a breathtaking transformation in recent
scholarship.
Berman gives a broad outline of the development of Western
legal science and of the emergence of Roman law and canon law
after 1100.1 His description of canon law as the first modern west-
ern legal system is generally accurate. It may be an important con-
tribution to make specialized research in that field known to a
wider public. Berman's book, however, provides little information
about the earlier canon law tradition; the canon law of the 1100's is
seen as an almost completely fresh and revolutionary body of legal
texts fulfilling the program of Gregory VII's "Dictatus Papae.
' 10
This perspective is too one-sided. Berman does not discuss the im-
portant older canonical collections that laid the basis for the
twelfth-century development. The main link between old and new
canon law, Gratian's Decretum,n is treated as a revolutionary work
of legal theory,12 whereas in fact Gratian relied on elementary dis-
tinctions that had been made by Isidore of Seville in late antiquity.
Gratian cites Isidore in the beginning of his Decretum; 3 his own
remarks on the Isidorian texts reveal a rather limited understand-
ing of Roman legal concepts and a partial confusion of natural law
and biblical law, but no consistent modern legal theory.
Berman's account of the influence of Roman law in the middle
ages also has serious distortions. He surveys university instruction
in Roman law from the twelfth century onwards, 4 but he neglects
the importance of Roman law in the daily practice of the courts.
I Id. at 199-254.
10 See id. at 201-02, 206-07.
11 GRATLN, A CoNcoRDANCE OF DiscoRDANrr CANONS, published as DEcRETuM in 1
CoRPus Ioins CANONICI (E. Friedberg ed. 1879 & reprint 1959).
" See BERmAN at 145, 202.
Is In Distinctio I-IV.
14 BERMAN at 120-64.
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Roman law and canon law are treated as more or less separate sys-
tems. Berman overlooks the important ways in which secular law
had been fused with canonical practice from an early date. The
whole process of the revival and reception of Roman law will be
misunderstood if one conceives of Roman law in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries as an "ideal law" that had little practical
importance.
Extensive chapters deal with the emergence of legal studies
and the methods of legal science in the middle ages. Modern sci-
ence, even natural science, is said by Berman to have its roots in
medieval legal science shaped by scholastic methods.15 Berman
claims that the jurists of the twelfth century made "experiments"
comparable to those in modern science in their case-oriented expo-
sitions of legal questions."' This is an anachronistic position. There
were enormous methodological differences between scholastic sci-
ence and modern historical and natural science. Using the word
"science" to refer to both the activities of medieval lawyers and
those of modern physicists retards rather than promotes under-
standing of the medieval form of rationality.
The second part of the book, which describes the formation of
secular legal systems, sketches the broad outlines of the historical
development of feudal, manorial, mercantile, urban, and royal law.
Berman is certainly correct to stress the central importance of
canon law in the western legal tradition after 1100. Papal decretal
law served as a model for the law-making activity of medieval
kings. Roman and canon law influenced the systematic elaboration
of feudal law and might have stimulated the development of urban
law. There is much valuable information here, but it is marred by
the same shortcomings evident in the discussions of the role of Ro-
man law and canon law. The chapter on manorial law, for example,
builds on English scholarship, ignoring recent continental develop-
ments. Urban law was, according to Berman, largely a result of
revolts by emerging merchant communities.17 This generalization is
false for many parts of Europe, where the development was contin-
uous and evolutionary. Berman correctly takes note of the impor-
tance of royal legislation, but he misleads in speaking of systems of
royal law.18 Berman supposes that because the Gregorian revolu-
tion developed the concept of the Church, it unavoidably had the
Is Id. at 120-21.
26 Id.
17 See id. at 357-403.
18 See, e.g., id. at 406, 516.
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consequence of developing the concept of the State.19 This was
true in the long run, but not for the twelfth and thirteenth centu-
ries, an epoch still dominated by a concept of unity within the
"Christianitas." The first treatise on the Church as a separate en-
tity was written at the beginning of the fourteenth century by
James of Viterbo;20 the first treatise on the State was probably
Dante's De Monarchia.21 The great event in the articulation of the
concept of the State and the origins of political science was the
translation of Aristotle's writings around 1260.
Berman uses the historical material to support his legal the-
ory. Although it is difficult to give a summary of Berman's theoret-
ical point of view because the historical narrative often obscures
the theoretical argument, as a general matter Berman sees his
principal contribution to a social theory of law in his partial oppo-
sition to the theories of Karl Marx and Max Weber. Berman's fun-
damental difference with Marx's theory lies in his view of law as an
independent factor in historical change, even a cause of revolution-
ary developments. 22 Berman rejects the view that economic condi-
tions should be taken as the decisive reason for the different role of
law in European and non-European societies,2 and denies the ana-
lytical value of the Marxist dichotomy between basis and super-
structure24 as well as the Marxist periodization of history that dis-
tinguishes between a feudal and a capitalist epoch.2 He argues
that the middle ages and the early modern period were neither
predominantly feudal nor without strong commercial development,
refering to modern research on the commercial revolution in the
middle ages28 which he ventures to call an "industrial revolu-
tion. 2 7 Marxist categories fail to explain the particular European
legal developments after 1100 because they are tied to an inade-
quate, unidimensional theory of economic causation. In his attack
on traditional Marxist arguments, however, Berman does not take
account of the more sophisticated ideas Marx himself sometimes
19 See, e.g., id. at 520-21, 527.
20 See H.X. ARQumLLnm, LE PLUS ANCIEN TRAITE DE L'IGLISE: JACQUES DE VrrERBE, DE
REGIMINE CHRISTINO (1301-1302); ETUDE DES SoURcES l wDrIION CRITIQUE (1926).
21 There is no agreement on the precise date of Dante's De Monarchia, but it was cer-
tainly written between 1308 and 1317. See 3 ENCICLOPEDIA DANTESCA 1001 (1971).
22 Id. at 538-558.
23 Id. at 545.
24 Id. at 295-96, 539-58.
25 Id. at 42-43, 542, 544.
" See, e.g., id. at 351, 359; see generally R.S. Lo PEz, THE Co RCM&La REVOLUTION OF
THE MIDDLE AGES 950-1350 (1976).
27 Bm A at 359.
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developed.28 Marx in fact saw interrelations between law and eco-
nomics in both directions.
Berman adopts some categories from Max Weber's famous
analysis in the Rechtssoziologie, for example, those regarding the
importance of legal specialists ("Rechtshonoratioren") in European
legal development and the role of rational concepts open for sys-
tematic interpretation (formal rationality).2 But Berman thinks
that Weber's categories of charismatic, traditional, and rational
law cannot be used to describe the phases of Europe's legal his-
tory, 0 and hence, that Weber cannot explain the causes for the
major legal transformations in the twelfth century. It is certainly
true that Weber's categories are inadequate for distinguishing dif-
ferent epochs in European legal history. On the other hand,
Weber's concepts are more helpful as analytical tools for legal his-
torians than any other existing concepts in legal sociology.
Berman's criticism does not fully recognize Weber's idea of the so-
ciological concept as an "ideal type". Weber's theory was not
meant to be an abstraction based upon specific European develop-
ments but rather was to be a common denominator for similarities
in legal cultures as diverse as China and the Islamic countries.
Berman criticizes Marx and Weber and rejects a purely ideo-
logical or idealistic understanding of the historical development of
law. Yet, in the end, it is hard to understand Berman's own theo-
retical approach. Although he disdains idealistic, economic, and
socio-political theories, he stresses incessantly the importance of
interrelations between law and other forces-religious, economic,
social, and political. He seems to combine elements of Marx's and
Weber's theories with ideas taken from the nineteenth-century
German historical school that emphasized the decisive role of cus-
tom in legal history. Berman knows that law can be and sometimes
has been a relatively independent social system with a certain his-
tory of its own,3 1 of which Marx and Engels revealed their misun-
derstanding in their famous saying, "We do not know any history
2" See Landau, Karl Marx und die Rechtsgeschichte, 41 TmscHRFr VOOR RECHTSGES-
CHIEDENIS 361-71 (1973). In this article I show that Marx distinguished different legal struc-
tures in early agrarian societies in spite of the fact that they shared the same economic base.
The different rules of legal organization in these early societies were mainly the result of
political events like war, as Marx suggests in the text of his first draft of Das Kapital. Marx
did not argue that all capitalist societies developed the same legal system, but rather that all
capitalist societies had legal systems that lagged behind the stage of development of each
society's economic substructure.
29 See generally MAX WEBER, RECHTSSOZIoLOGIE (2d ed. 1967).
80 See BE mAN at 547-51.
21 See id. at 542-45.
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of law." He observes that legal innovation can transform tradi-
tional societies by introducing foreign institutions, and that the
history of western law since the twelfth century was unique in
many respects.32 But this is hardly a general social theory of
law-if that were in any event a reasonable goal for the study of
legal history. I think that legal historians can make contributions
to such theories only by working on a higher comparative level
than Berman does in this work, by testing western law against the
results of legal historical research on the ancient Orient, the Is-
lamic countries, China, and the different primitive societies. Max
Weber tried to do that within the limits of historical knowledge at
the turn of the century. Berman's book has the shortcomings of
exclusive concentration on the western middle ages. It does not
give a comprehensive social theory of law.
Stressing the objections to Berman's view of legal history and
legal theory should not denigrate the major contributions of this
work. Berman seems justified in his periodization of legal history.
The eleventh and twelfth centuries do mark a watershed in the
history of western law and of western society, probably a more im-
portant watershed than the Reformation. In this period, our legal
tradition was born: there is an essential legal continuity from the
Catholic middle ages through the Reformation, and beyond.
Berman's attempt to overcome a nationalistic approach in legal
history 3 also seems correct. It will be necessary for legal historians
to do much more work on the common roots of civil, common, and
canon law systems in the future. Moreover, the author's idea that
canon law limited the influence of feudalism in the middle ages
and had a revolutionary impact in many sectors of medieval soci-
ety is supported by much evidence and may even justify the title
"Law and Revolution" for a book on the European influence of
canon law. Although his attempt to use varied methods and ap-
proaches is stimulating, one should read the book critically, aware
that it reflects no first-hand study of the historical facts upon
which it depends.
See id. at 546.
' See, e.g., id. at 1-4, 538-39.
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